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A STATUTORY PROPOSAL PROTECTING EMPLOYMENT
EXPECTATIONS OF A CLOSE CORPORATION'S
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
So I returned and considered all the oppressions that are done under the
sun: and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no com-
forter; and on the side of their oppressors there was power, but they had no
comforter.1
In a close corporation,' majority shareholders3 have the capacity to
squeeze-out 4 one or more minority shareholders from the corporation.5
The minority shareholder has few available remedies to counter majority
1. Ecclesiastes 4:1.
2. A small number of shareholders typically own and manage a close corporation. The shares
of the corporation generally are not traded in the securities market. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
308 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
The Delaware corporations statute defines a close corporation as a corporation whose certificate of
incorporation (1) limits record ownership of its stock to not more than a specified number of per-
sons, not exceeding thirty; (2) subjects all its issued stock to one or more statutorily permitted re-
strictions on transfer; and (3) prohibits the corporation from making a public offering of its stock
under the federal Securities Act of 1933. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1975).
In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), the court listed the
following characteristics of a close corporation: "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready
market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the manage-
ment, direction and operation of the corporation." Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
Professor O'Neal defines the term "close corporation" as a "corporation whose shares are not
generally traded in the securities markets." I F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02, at 3-4 (2d
ed. 1970).
3. Commentators define the terms "majority" and "minority shareholders" as follows:
[T]he terms "majority" and "minority" are used to distinguish those shareholders who
possess the actual power to control the operations of the firm from those who do not.
Although control is most often determined by the size of shareholdings, it does not depend
upon 51% ownership. For example, control might be exercised by a nonmajority share-
holder who has special skills upon which the business depends.
Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remain-
ing Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 5 n.7 (1977).
4. The term "squeeze-out" describes the method by which some of the owners in a business
enterprise utilize strategic position, inside information, power of control, or legal devices to eliminate
one or more owners or participants from the enterprise. See F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS § 1.01, at 1 (1975 & Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as F. O'NEAL]. The terms
"freeze-out" and "squeeze-out" are synonyms. 1 H. MARSH, MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
LAW § 10.41 (2d ed. 1981).
5. As a general proposition, the persons holding a majority of the voting shares of a corpora-
tion have the power to elect all the corporate directors. The directors determine corporate policy,
select corporate officers, hire employees, and supervise the operation of the corporation. Majority
interests can deprive minority interests of any voice in the operation of the business. F. O'NEAL,
supra note 4, § 1.03, at 3.
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shareholder oppression. 6 If he is dissatisfied with his position in the cor-
poration, the minority shareholder may desire to sell his stock in the
corporation.7 Unlike shares in a public corporation that are traded regu-
larly, however, minority shares in a close corporation may be unmarket-
able8 because potential purchasers often hesitate to assume an inferior
position in a close corporation.9 Because they already enjoy control, the
majority shareholders would gain little from buying out the minority
shareholder."0 Thus, to liquidate his investment, the minority share-
holder may be forced to accept a majority shareholder's offer for the
stock that is substantially below its true market value."1
A common squeeze-out technique is to discharge the minority share-
holder from corporate employment. 12  The minority shareholder in a
close corporation often expects the corporation to employ him on a full-
6. A number of states have enacted statutes authorizing dissolution as a remedy for minority
shareholders. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
Some courts consider dissolution to be drastic, however, and hesitate to grant such relief. See, e.g.,
Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84
Ill. App. 3d 294, 300, 405 N.E.2d 839, 844 (1980).
Minority shareholders may preclude relief by failing to insist upon a shareholders' agreement or
appropriate charter or bylaw provisions. Minority shareholders may be unaware of the potential
risks involved, or they may lack the bargaining power necessary to negotiate for protection. See F.
O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 9.03, at 582.
7. The minority shareholder's alternative, in effect, is to abandon his investment. See Hether-
ington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1,
29; Note, Meiselman v. Meiselman" "Reasonable Expectations" Determine Minority Shareholders'
Rights, 62 N.C.L. REv. 999, 1005 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Rights of Minority Shareholders].
8. See, eg., Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982) (to prevent bank
from calling in its loan to the minority shareholder on the assertion his stock had no value for
collateral purposes, another shareholder had to assure the bank he would purchase the shares if the
loan were foreclosed); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 58 N.C. App. 758, 295 S.E.2d 249 (1982), modified,
309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983) (court deemed the minority shareholder's interest, having a
book value between three and seven million dollars, worthless as a producer of income).
9. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty, 167 N.J. Super. 141, 152, 400 A.2d 554, 560 (Law.
Div. 1979), aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994, cert. denied, 85 N.J. 112, 425 A.2d 273 (App.
Div. 1980). See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 2.15, at 42; Note, Involuntary Dissolution of
Close Corporations for Mistreatment of Minority Shareholders, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1119, 1121 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Involuntary Dissolution].
10. The only benefit that the majority can gain by purchasing the minority's interest is the
portion of earnings attributable to that interest. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3, at 6.
11. See, eg., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 637, 507 P.2d 387, 398
(1973) (it is common knowledge that the minority interest is worth considerably less than book
value).
12. See, eg., Crawford v. Mindell, 57 Md. App. 111, 469 A.2d 454 (1984) (chairman of board
discharged minority shareholders); Miller v. Winshall, 9 Mass. App. 312, 400 N.E.2d 1306 (1980)
(directors removed minority shareholder from position as president).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss3/10
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER EMPLOYMENT
time basis.13 He may invest all of his assets, expecting to live off the
salary he receives from the corporation. If the corporation discharges
him, the minority shareholder may lose his means of livelihood as well as
the value of his investment in the corporation.1 4
Absent an express or implied employment contract, the minority
shareholder-employee is subject to the employer's traditional right to dis-
charge employees for any reason.' 5 Unlike the employees in a majority
of other industrialized nations, 6 private sector employees 7 in the United
States generally lack protection from unjust discharge. Either the em-
ployee or the employer can terminate the employment at will."8 Some
courts have been sympathetic to the employee-at-will, creating excep-
tions to the employment-at-will rule.19
Part One of this Note examines various squeeze-out techniques. Part
Two of this Note describes the historical development of the employ-
ment-at-will rule and provides an overview of the major judicially devel-
oped exceptions. Part Three discusses recent court cases offering
protection to minority shareholders based on their reasonable expecta-
tions. Part Four proposes an involuntary dissolution and alternative re-
lief statute that would create an exception to the employment-at-will rule
for close corporation shareholder-employees and would enable courts to
grant relief to minority shareholders. This Note concludes that the pro-
13. See, ag., O'Donnel v. Marine Repair Services, 530 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Wilkes
v. Springside Nursing Home, 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
14. See, eg., Keck v. Schumacher, 198 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (discharged share-
holder left with no income for living expenses); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d
551 (1983) (discharged employee deprived of salary, car, insurance, use of corporate credit cards,
and participation in profit sharing trust).
15. See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), rev'don other grounds sub.
nom. Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
16. For a discussion of foreign statutes protecting employees from unjust dismissal, see gener-
ally INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT (C. Aronstein ed. 1976); Sher-
man, Reinstatement as a Remedy for Unfair Dismissal in Common Market Countries, 29 AM. J.
COMP. L. 467, 506-11 (1981); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal. Time For a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 508-19 (1976).
17. Federal civil service employees are protected under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
§ 204(a), 5 U.S.C. § 7403 (1982). State government employees are also afforded a wide range of
protections. See J. WEISBERGER, JOB SECURITY AND THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 9-19, 45-65 (2d ed.
1973).
18. To mitigate the impact of the employment-at-will rule, unions typically negotiate an agree-
ment providing for dismissal only for just cause. For an example of such a clause, see Phillips
Petroleum Co., 48 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 402, 403 (1967).
19. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
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posed statute would effectively balance the interests of both minority and
majority shareholders.
I. SQUEEZE-OUT CAUSES, TECHNIQUES, AND REMEDIES
IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
When an investor decides to become a shareholder in a close corpora-
tion, he usually assumes that during the life of the corporation the share-
holders will determine the operation of the corporation.2" The individual
shareholders may regard themselves as partners with common control of
the business. 2
Not all close corporations, however, are harmoniously managed. Dis-
agreement over corporate policy may arise for many different reasons,
including greed and desire for power by one or more shareholders.22
Disagreement over corporate policy may eventually lead to a squeeze-out
of minority shareholders. Majority shareholders use various squeeze-out
techniques, including withholding dividend payments on corporate
stock,2 3 voting the minority shareholder off the board of directors, and
discharging the minority shareholder from corporate employment.24
20. See Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York- Liberalizing the Rights of Minority
Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 24, 26 (1981); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3, at 2.
21. See, eg., Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 177 Ind. App. 224, 228, 378 N.E.2d 941,
945 (1978) ("while parties incorporate to obtain the benefits of limited liability, perpetual existence
of business entity or tax considerations accruing to the corporate form, they often expect to act and
be treated as partners in their dealings among themselves").
22. See Frasier v. Trans-Western Land Corp., 210 Neb. 681, 316 N.W.2d 612 (1982) (greedy
majority shareholders attempted to oust minority shareholders to realize greater profits). Disagree-
ment may also occur for the following reisons: the existence of an inactive shareholder, see
Schwartz v. Marien, 43 A.D.2d 307, 351 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1974); the death of a founder, see In re
Radmon & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954); the existence of an autocratic control-
ling shareholder, see Crandall v. Conole, 230 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa. 1964); the entry of a minority
shareholder in a competing business, see Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122
(1951); the failure to reduce the bargain to writing, see Lewis v. Compton, 416 So. 2d 1219 (Fla.
App. 1982); and the occurrence of personality clashes, see Johnson v. Livingston Nursing Home, 282
Ala. 309, 211 So. 2d 151 (1968).
23. See, eg., Kohn v. Birmingham Realty, 352 So. 2d 834 (Ala. 1977); Alaska Plastics, Inc. v.
Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Miller v. Magline Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761
(1977).
24. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. If a clause in the corporate charter or bylaws
authorizes the corporation to purchase the shares of a holder who ceases to be an employee, remov-
ing the shareholder can be the first of two steps to eliminate him from the corporation. See, e.g.,
Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); Keating v. B.B.D.O.
Int'l, 438 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Majority shareholders also can utilize state corporate code provisions to squeeze out minority
shareholders. These provisions may enable a board of directors: 1) to alter shareholder rights for a
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss3/10
Number 3] MINORITY SHAREHOLDER EMPLOYMENT
The principles of majority rule25 and the business judgment rule2 6 have
often prevented the minority shareholder from obtaining effective relief
from these tactics. As a result of this hardship, some states have enacted
legislation designed to protect the interests of the minority shareholder. 27
class of shares; see, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 900 (Deering 1977), N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 804
(Consol. 1983); see also McIntosh v. Magna Systems, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (direc-
tors caused articles of incorporation to be amended to eliminate plaintiff's contractual right to
purchase 25% of corporation's authorized stock); 2) to redeem shares; see, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8 § 243 (1975); 3) to merge or consolidate with other corporations; see, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 1100-03 (Deering 1977); 4) to sell or mortgage assets; see, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 272
(1975); 5) to complete a short form merger; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (1975); and 6) to
dissolve the corporation; see, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 275 (1975).
25. The persons holding a majority of the voting shares possess the power to elect all the direc-
tors. The directors determine corporate policy, select corporate officers, and supervise the operation
of the corporation. Majority interests can deprive minority interests of any voice in the operation of
the business. F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 1.03, at 3.
26. The business judgment rule grants broad discretion to directors to determine business pol-
icy and conduct corporate affairs. The rule is based on the following beliefs: (1) courts should not
substitute their judgment for that of directors who were selected to manage the business; (2) courts
are not qualified to make complex business decisions; and (3) shareholders should be discouraged
from instituting frivolous litigation. F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 583. See, eg., In re Reading
Co., 711 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1983) (court will not disturb the judgment of a board of directors if the
judgment has any rational business purpose); Willis v. Dillsburg Grain & Milling, 490 F. Supp. 46
(M.D. Pa. 1980) (court will not interfere with the internal business policies of a corporation absent a
clear showing of fraud or abuse of discretion).
27. Some state statutes permit shareholders to petition for involuntary dissolution of a corpora-
tion. Involuntary dissolution refers to mandatory dissolution by court order rather than voluntary
dissolution by a majority vote of shareholders. For an example of involuntary dissolution legislation,
see MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 94-103 (1971). Courts, however, are reluctant to authorize
dissolution of a corporation because its liquidation value is usually less than the value of the going
business concern. See Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 398, 279 S.W.2d 848, 857 (1955) ("[W]e
agree with the practically unanimous judicial opinion that liquidation of solvent going corporations
should be the extreme or ultimate remedy, involving as it usually will, accentuation of the economic
waste incident to many receiverships and most forced sales.").
Many states also offer statutory alternatives to dissolution, authorizing the courts to cancel, alter,
or enjoin acts of the corporation, shareholders, directors, or officers. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10-216 (1977); CALIF. CORP. CODE § 1803 (Deering 1977); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 450-1825 (West 1974).
Several state statutes permit a judicially supervised buy-out of the minority shareholder's interest
by the corporation or other shareholders. See, eg., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 12.55 (1984); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1251.1 (1975).
Most state statutes follow the Model Business Corporation Act to determine whether dissolution
or alternative relief is appropriate. The Act focuses on "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" actions of
majority shareholders. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 97 (1971). Courts interpret these statutes
narrowly, usually requiring a finding of wrongful conduct prior to granting statutory relief. See, e.g.,
Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. App. 1976) (combination of provisions giving long-
term management control to majority shareholder, heavy corporate losses, and salary increases to
the majority deemed not oppressive). For similar holdings, see Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill.
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Traditionally, however, the minority shareholder has limited recourse
against the discharge from employment technique because of a common-
law rule known as the employment-at-will rule.
II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE
A. Development and Legislative Limitations
The employment-at-will rule, which developed domestically,28 grants
an employer complete freedom to discharge any employee.2 9 The courts
adopted the rule to foster growth during the industrial revolution in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.30 During this period of
laissez-faire economics, the rule seemed equitable. 31 The United States
Supreme Court in Adair v. United States32 and Coppage v. Kansas33 held
App. 3d 294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507
P.2d 387 (1973); White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972).
28. For early cases applying the employment-at-will rule, see Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring
Co., 163 F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908); Haney v. Caldwell, 35 Ark. 156 (1879); Lord v. Goldberg, 81
Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889); Faulkner v. Des Moines Drug Co., 117 Iowa 120, 90 N.W. 585 (1902);
McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 A. 176 (1887); Sullivan v. Detroit, Y. & A.A.
Ry., 135 Mich. 661, 98 N.W. 756 (1904); Capron v. Strout, 11 Nev. 304 (1876).
See generally DeGuiseppe, The Effect of the Employment at Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job
Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 5-8 (1976); Note, Judicial Limitations of the
Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 552, 554-56 (1980).
29. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). See generally
Feinman, The Development of the Employment-al-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 131-35
(1976); Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGs L.J.
1435, 1440 (1975).
30. See, eg., Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg., 17 Del. 581, 43 A. 609 (1899); Louisville, & N.
R.R. v. Harvey, 99 Ky. 157, 34 S.W. 1069 (1896); Finger v. Koch & Schilling Brewing Co., 13 Mo.
App. 310 (1883); Martin v. New York Life Ins., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). See generally
DeGuiseppe, supra note 28, at 7-8; Feinman, supra note 29, at 126.
31. The writers of this period insisted upon freedom of bargaining as a "fundamental and indis-
pensable requisite of progress." Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921).
In Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 139 So. 760 (1932), the court explained
why an employment contract for an indefinite term would be terminable at will:
An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently, thereby cutting himself
off from all chances of improving his condition; indeed, in this land of opportunity it would
be against public policy and the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handi-
cap himself.... And if the contract of employment be not binding on the employee...
then it cannot be binding upon the employer; there would be lack of "mutuality."
Id. at 67, 139 So. at 761.
For the assertion that the contract principles of mutuality of obligation and mutuality of consider-
ation are no longer important, see Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Over-
whelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329, 337 (1982).
32. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). InAdair, the Court struck down a federal statute that barred common
carriers from dismissing employees for union membership. Id. at 168.
33. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Coppage, the Court invalidated a Kansas statute forbidding "yellow
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the rule constitutional, stating that employers had the right to enter and
terminate contracts and to acquire and hold property free from judicial
and legislative restraints.3"
In the era of recovery following the Depression, the development of a
technologically advanced economy altered the roles of employers and
employees. Employers wielded significantly greater bargaining power
than employees." Recognizing this disparity, the Supreme Court backed
away from a strict employment-at-will rule.36  In NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court upheld Congress' power to protect
union activity, limiting employers' ability to discharge employees for
union affiliation.3"
Federal legislation further limited the employment-at-will rule, pro-
hibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of race,39 sex,'
dog" contracts. Id. at 6-7. A "yellow dog" contract is an agreement between an employer and
employee that obligates the employee not to join or remain a member of a labor organization.
34. Id. at 23. The Court relied heavily on Adair, reasoning that each party had the right to
stipulate the terms of the agreement relative to continuance of the employment relationship at the
contract's inception.
35. The rapid expansion of the early American industrial economy initially created jobs at a
rate sufficient to provide work for those displaced as a result of technological advances and to ac-
comodate an increase in the size of the work force. This situation, however, was short-lived. Y.
BRENNER, A SHORT HISTORY OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 210-11 (1969). Inevitably, the number of
qualified workers began to exceed the number of available positions. As a result, the employer ac-
quired significant leverage in negotiating employment contracts. The inequality in bargaining posi-
tion resulted in long hours and poor working conditions for the labor force. J. GALBRAITH,
AMERICAN CAPITALISM 114-15 (1956).
Commentators argued that because of the imbalance in the employment relationship, the employ-
ment-at-will rule should be abolished. See, eg., Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust DismissaL Time For a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976);
Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1931 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Protecting Employees].
More recently, however, commentators have defended the employment-at-will rule. See, eg.,
Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 881 (1983); Note, Limiting
the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Right to Terminate].
36. See Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930); Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States Ry. Labor Bd., 261
U.S. 72 (1923).
37. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
38. Id. at 33.
39. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)). Under Title VII, an employer may not
discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment on account of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
40. Id.
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age, '4 1 physical handicap,42 or union activity.43  Following the lead of
Congress, many states passed statutes banning unjust dismissals in the
areas of civil rights,' workers' compensation 4 labor relations, 46 polit-
ical activity,47 jury duty," health and safety,49 and whistle blowing.5
B. Judicial Limitations on the Employment-At- Will Rule
Courts have also limited the employment-at-will rule,51 developing a
public policy exception52 and imposing a good faith and fair dealing re-
quirement in the employment relationship.53
41. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631, 633(a) (1982).
The Act protects persons between the ages of 40 and 70 years from age discrimination by private
employers, the federal government, and labor unions. The Act also protects workers from retalia-
tory discharge for exercising rights under the Act.
42. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
43. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). The Act
prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an employee for exercising his
rights to participate in union activity, file charges, or give testimony under the Act.
44. See, eg., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a)(e) (Consol. 1983).
45. See, eg., Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
46. See, eg., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3519(a) (Deering 1982).
47. See, eg., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1978).
48. See, eg., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 532 (Consol. 1983).
49. See, eg., CAL. LAB. CODE § 6310 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1985).
50. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51 (West 1983).
51. For other miscellaneous theories relied on by discharged employees, see Novosel v. Nation-
wide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (interference with constitutionally protected free speech);
Cotes v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (intentional interference with
contract); Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (negligence); American
Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361 (Ala. 1980) (intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Ezekial v. Windey, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977) (rights of fair procedure);
Hamlen v. Fairchilds Indus., Inc., 413 So. 2d 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (fraud); Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (implied contract from employee
handbooks and manuals); McCullough v. Certain Teed Products Corp., 70 A.D.2d 771, 417
N.Y.S.2d 353 (1979) (prima facie tort). See generally 3 L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
'TON §§ 119.20-119.53 (1984).
52. Courts in the following 22 states have recognized the public policy exception: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Dis-
charge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80's, 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 6 n.30
(1984).
53. State law in the following 18 states recognizes some form of wrongful discharge action for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington. Id. at 17 n.92.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss3/10
Number 3] MINORITY SHAREHOLDER EMPLOYMENT
1. Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception is the most widely accepted judicial limita-
tion on the employment-at-will rule. 4 The cases in jurisdictions that rec-
ognize this exception fall into three categories. First, some courts have
refused to apply the employment-at-will rule when an employer dis-
charges an employee for refusing to commit an unlawful or wrongful
act. 55 Second, some courts have refused to apply the rule when an em-
ployer discharges an employee for exercising a statutory right. 6 Finally,
some courts have refused to apply the rule when an employer discharges
an employee for performing a public obligation. 7
54. See Protecting Employees, supra note 35, at 1936; Comment, Guidelines for a Public Policy
Exception to the Employment at Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617
(1981).
In order to invoke this exception, a showing must be made that the discharge involves public
policy and not just private interests. Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977). In Scroghan, the court held that no public policy was involved when the employer fired an
employee for announcing his intention to attend night law school contrary to the employer's wishes.
Other courts have denied wrongful discharge claims on the basis that mere private interests were
at stake. See, eg., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. App. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (1980) (threaten-
ing to sue employer for injury unrelated to work); Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573
P.2d 907 (1977) (refusing to take a lie detector test); M.B.M. Co. v. Cource, 26 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d
681 (1980) (falsely accused of stealing from cash register); Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal. App.
2d 63, 60 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967) (falsely downgraded on job performance test); Jackson v. Minidoka
Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (missing the company's Christmas fund); Abrisz
v Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978) (questioning employer's integrity); Keneally v.
Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980) (questioning employer's internal management system); Jones v.
Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979) (taking too much sick leave); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95
Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980) (cohabiting with co-employee while having an affair
with a married employer).
In a majority of the jurisdictions that recognize the public policy exception, the cause of action is
grounded in tort law. The rationale is that the employer's duty arises from public policy independ-
ent of the contract between the employer and employee. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27
Cal. 3d 167, 177, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 480, 427 A.2d 385, 388-89 (1980). Contra Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,
113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
A tort action is advantageous to a wrongfully discharged employee because tort law, unlike con-
tract law, allows recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. See Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l
Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378, 383-85 (6th Cir. 1983); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Il. 2d 172, 186-90,
384 N.E.2d 353, 359-60 (1978). But see Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., 653 F.2d 1057, 1064
(5th Cir. 1981) (disallowing punitive damages for the tort of wrongful discharge).
A tort action also provides a longer statute of limitations. See, eg., Shanholtz v. Monongahela
Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980).
55. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 39658 typ-
ifies the first category. In Petermann, the plaintiff alleged that his em-
ployer instructed him to commit perjury. When he refused, the employer
discharged him.59 The California Court of Appeals noted that although
an employer generally has the right to terminate an employee-at-will,
that right could be limited by public policy considerations.' The
Petermann court viewed the discharge as retaliation against the employee
for refusing to commit an act prohibited by statute. In order to effectuate
the declared public policy behind the statute, the court limited the em-
ployer's power to terminate the employee-at-will. 6 '
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. 62 illustrates the second category.
In Frampton, the employee filed a workman's compensation claim for a
job-related injury. After the employee received a settlement, the em-
ployer fired her in retaliation. 63 The court limited the employer's power
to terminate the employee-at-will, concluding that fear of discharge may
have a deleterious effect on an employee's exercise of a statutory right.64
Other jurisdictions have disagreed whether discharging an employee in
retaliation for filing a workman's compensation claim is actionable.65
58. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). But see Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428
A.2d 831 (D.C. App. 1981) (after retaliatory discharge of employee for testifying truthfully against
her employer at an administrative proceeding, court denied petition for rehearing en banc).
59. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 185, 344 P.2d at 27.
60. Id. at 186, 344 P.2d at 27.
61. The California Supreme Court reaffirmed Petermann in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1333, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
Courts have upheld numerous causes of action for unjust dismissal when employees have refused
to commit unlawful acts. See McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (refusal
to participate in illegal price fixing scheme); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 527 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D.
Ind. 1982) (refusal to violate antitrust laws); Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp.
1076 (M.D. Cal. 1982) (refusal to engage in business practices abroad in violation of foreign, federal,
and state laws); Trombetta v. Detroit, Tol. & I. R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978)
(refusal to alter pollution control reports in violation of state law); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J.
Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978) (refusal to perform a medical procedure that the employee could
not lawfully perform). But see Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976)
(employer not liable for discharging employee for disputing false corporate representations to the
federal government); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (employer not
liable for discharging employee for refusing to falsify medical records).
62. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
63. Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
64. Id.
65. Compare Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (retaliatory dis-
charge actionable); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) (actionable);
Hansen v. Harrah's, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3024 (Nev. 1984) (actionable) with Thurston v. Mache
Co., 716 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (not actionable); Kelly v. Mississippi Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874
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Those courts that have refused to limit the employment-at-will rule insist
that such causes of action are best created by the legislature.66
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. exemplifies the third cate-
gory.67 In Palmateer, the employer discharged the employee for supply-
ing law enforcement authorities with information concerning another
employee's possible involvement in criminal activities. 68  The Illinois
Supreme Court allowed the employee's wrongful discharge action,69
holding that no public policy is more important than that favoring the
effective protection of lives and property through enforcement of a state
criminal code.7"
2. Implied Covenant of Good Faith
Some courts have overridden the employment-at-will rule by imposing
(Miss. 1981) (not actionable); Bottijlso v. Hutchinson Fin., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (App. 1981)
(not actionable).
66. See Firestone Textile v. Meadows, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3559, 3561 (Ky. 1983); Suchodol-
ski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 696, 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982); Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 577-79, 335 N.W. 2d 834, 841 (1983).
Some courts, however, have extended protection to employees who exercised statutory rights
other than filing workers' compensation claims. See, eg., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, 611
F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (right to refuse to take a polygraph test); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App.
3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970) (right to designate an attorney to negotiate terms of employment);
Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (en banc) (right to join a labor union).
But cf Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (permissible
discharge when employee hired attorney); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. App.
1980) (employee's nonunion or union status is not actionable despite state's right-to-work law).
67. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
68. ,d. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
69. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880. The court stated that "[n]o specific constitutional or statu-
tory provision requires a citizen to take an active part in ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but
public policy nevertheless favors citizen crime fighters."
70. Id. Courts have applied this exception to other general public policies. See, e.g., Wiskotoni
v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983) (discharge for being subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury violates public policy); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471,
427 A.2d 385 (1980) (wrongful discharge of director who tried to correct false and misleading food
labeling violates public policy); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728
(1982) (discharge of pharmacist who objected to unlawful plan to close the pharmacy violates public
policy); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (termination of
employee for performing jury duty actionable).
But see Bender Ship Repair v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980) (no cause of action when
employer fined employee for serving on grand jury); Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054
(Ind. App. 1980) (no cause of action when employee discharged for protest against dangerous drug
and submission of erroneous drug data); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d
464 (1981) (no cause of action when employee dismissed after exposing illegal and improper corpo-
rate conduct).
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a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship. In
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,71 the seminal case imposing such a duty, the
employer discharged the plaintiff, a female machine operator, when she
refused to date her foreman.72 In recognition of Monge's claim, the
court stated that if an employer terminates an employee-at-will for rea-
sons of bad faith, malice, or retaliation, the termination is not in the best
interest of the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
contract.7" Other jurisdictions recognizing the good faith doctrine typi-
cally apply it to cases in which the discharged employee has worked for
the employer for a long period of time,74 or in which the employer has
deprived the employee of bonuses, wages, or commissions.75
III. PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS'
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
Majority oppression statutes generally focus on the majority share-
holders' oppressive acts to provide relief to minority shareholders. Re-
cently, however, several courts have shifted the focus of their analysis
under majority oppression statutes, examining minority shareholders'
reasonable expectations to determine if majority oppression has oc-
curred.76 Similarly, several states have enacted new statutes that attempt
71. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
72. Id. at 132, 316 A.2d at 550.
73. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. Although the court made this statement in regard to an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, many courts and commentators discuss the case under
the public policy exception. See generally DeGuiseppe, supra note 28, at 26.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court subsequently limited the broad language it used in Monge.
See Howard v. Door Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980) (holding that Monge would
be applied only when an employer discharged an employee for performing an act that public policy
would encourage or refusing to do an act that public policy would condemn).
74. E.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v.
American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (court held longevity of em-
ployee's service was a significant factor in determining employer's liability for dismissal).
See also Chancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
employees must allege longevity of service and the existence of personnel policies or oral representa-
tions showing an implied promise not to deal with employees arbitrarily).
75. In Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), the plaintiff,
a salesman with forty years of experience, alleged that his employer discharged him to avoid award-
ing commission on a five million dollar sale. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that an
implied covenant of good faith existed in this particular case but refused to imply such a duty in
every employment contract. See also Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 391 Mass. 333, 461 N.E.2d 796
(1984) (upholding employee's right to receive commission after wrongful discharge).
76. See O'Donnel v. Marine Repair Servs., 530 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re
Taines, 111 Misc. 2d 559, 562-63, 444 N.Y.S.2d 540, 543-44 (1981); In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25,
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to protect the rights and interests of the minority shareholder. 7 7 Courts
have interpreted these new statutes to provide relief if conduct by the
majority breaches the reasonable expectations of the minority
shareholder.78
For example, in In Re Topper,79 Topper held a one-third interest in
two corporations. Topper, who had invested his life savings in the corpo-
rations, relocated from Florida to New York and terminated his previous
employment of twenty-five years in order to serve as an officer and em-
ployee of the two corporations.8" The majority shareholders who con-
trolled the two companies removed Topper from his positions as officer
and employee, terminated his salary, and changed the locks on the corpo-
rate offices.8" Applying a reasonable expectations test,82 the court found
28, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1980); see also Rights of Minority Shareholders,
supra note 7, at 1009-12.
77. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (Deering 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-7 (West
Supp. 1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(b)(2) (Consol. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4)
(1982).
In 1983 Minnesota adopted ground-breaking legislation that specifically provides that sharehold-
ers' reasonable expectations should be considered in determining relief in a shareholder controversy.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(3)(a) (West 1984). The statute reads as follows:
In determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution, or a buy-out, the court shall
take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely-held corporation owe
one another to act in honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation and the reason-
able expectations of the shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop during the
course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and with each other.
Id. (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the amendments to the Minnesota Act, see Olson, Statutory Changes Improve
Position of Minority Shareholders in Closely-Held Corporations, Hennepin Law. 10 (Sept.-Oct. 1983).
78. In Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty, 167 N.J. Super. 141,400 A.2d 554 (1979), afi'd, 173
N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980), the court recognized the minority shareholder's reasonable
expectation that he would someday participate in managing the company restaurant. The court,
however, refused to award dissolution, finding that the minority shareholder's failure to learn the
business frustrated his reasonable expectation. The court held that the minority shareholder's dis-
charge was not oppressive.
The California Court of Appeals took a somewhat different approach in Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf &
Sons, 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1975). In Stumpf, hostility existed between two
brothers, each of whom owned a one-third interest in a family corporation. After one brother sev-
ered ties with the family, the family limited his voice in the operation of the business and denied his
salary and dividends. The court held that these actions failed to qualify as oppressive within the
meaning of the statute, but ordered dissolution under the minority interest provision of the statute to
..assure fairness to minority shareholders." Id.
79. 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1980).
80. Id. at 27, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 31, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365. The court cited Professor O'Neal's treatise, supra note 4,
which states the underlying principle of the reasonable expectations test as follows:
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that the majority's squeeze-out destroyed Topper's reasonable expecta-
tion of actively participating in the corporations, thereby oppressing him
within the meaning of the statute. The court ordered the majority share-
holders to buy out Topper's interest, noting that the reasonable expecta-
tions of minority shareholders constitute part of the bargain between
shareholders when they form a corporation. 83
In Meiselman v. Meiselman,84 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
held that the minority shareholder's rights and interests in a close corpo-
ration include his reasonable expectations. 5 In Meiselman, two broth-
ers, Ira and Michael Meiselman, owned shares and served as employees
in several corporations founded by their father. 6 Ira, however, held a
majority of the shares in the corporations.87 Michael brought a deriva-
tive suit alleging that Ira caused one corporation to enter into an unfair
management contract with another company solely owned by Ira.88 Ira
discharged Michael from employment in the family businesses in retalia-
tion for Michael's suit.89
Michael sought relief under the state's majority oppression statute that
required liquidation to be "reasonably necessary" to protect the "rights
or interests" of a complaining minority shareholder. 90 The supreme
court declined to decide whether dissolution was reasonably necessary
[I]n a corporation based on a personal relationship a court should give relief, dissolution or
some other remedy, to a minority shareholder whenever corporate managers or controlling
shareholders act in a way that disappoints the minority shareholders' reasonable expecta-
tions, even though the acts of the managers or controlling shareholders fall within the
literal scope of powers or rights granted them by the corporation act or the corporation's
bylaws.
F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, at § 7.15.
For a discussion of the Topper case, see Davidian, supra note 20, at 48-56; Valenti, Business As.-
sociations, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 11, 11-15 (1982).
83. 107 Misc. 2d at 31, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365. The court ordered the majority shareholders to
buy out the shares of the minority pursuant to N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118 (Consol. 1983). Id. at
28-29, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
84. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
85. Id. at 291, 307 S.E.2d at 563. In Meiselman, the plaintiff brought suit under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982), which provides for dissolution or another more appropriate remedy
when "reasonably necessary" for the protection of the "right or interests" of the complaining
shareholder.
86. 309 N.C. at 282, 307 S.E.2d at 553.
87. Id. at 282-83, 307 S.E.2d at 553-54. Ira owned a 70% interest and Michael owned a 30%
interest.
88. Id. at 283, 307 S.E.2d at 554.
89. Id. Ira also took Michael's company car, his hospital and life insurance, his corporate credit
cards, and his interest in a profit-sharing trust. Id.
90. Id. at 282, 307 S.E.2d at 552-53.
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because the trial court failed to determine Michael's rights or interests.9
In instructions to the trial court for consideration on remand, the
supreme court stated that a complaining shareholder's rights or interests
in a close corporation include his reasonable expectations in the corpora-
tion.92 The court explained that in ascertaining these reasonable expecta-
tions, the trial court must consider expectations generated during the
entire relationship between the shareholder and the corporation, not just
expectations existing at the inception of this relationship.93
IV. PROPOSED INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION AND ALTERNATIVE
RELIEF STATUTE
Although all states have enacted statutes giving courts the power to
dissolve corporations, neither these statutes nor the case law provides
uniform standards to determine when a minority shareholder may obtain
dissolution or alternative relief.94 Because oppressive conduct occurs in
an infinite variety of forms and circumstances, 95 a statute specifically de-
fining oppressive conduct would be underinclusive.96 Likewise, an over-
broad statute may injure both majority and minority shareholders.97
This Note proposes a flexible involuntary dissolution and alternative
relief statute for shareholders in close corporations. The proposed stat-
ute seeks to insure equitable results by defining acceptable majority
91. Id. at 291, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
92. Id.
93. Id. Professor O'Neal adopts a similar view: "[A] court should examine the whole history of
the participant's relationship as expectations alter and new expectations develop over the course of
the participants' cooperative efforts in operating the business." F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 7.15 at
527.
94. See supra notes 27 & 76-77 and accompanying text. See also Davidian, supra note 20, at 59.
95. See supra notes 12-14 & 22-24 and accompanying text.
96. In Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), the court, commenting on
judicial definition of "oppression," stated: "Such definitions are suggested perimeters of the broad
term rather than narrow definitions which would tend to rob the term of its useful flexibility. As we
read the statute, it is intended the courts will proceed on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 358. See also
Davidian, supra note 20, at 59.
97. See Note, Corporate Dissolution for Illegal Oppressive or Fraudulent Acts: The Maryland
Solution, 28 MD. L. REV. 360, 372 (1968). The directors and controlling shareholders may be forced
to make their business judgments with a view toward avoiding violating a vague standard rather
than serving the best interests of the corporation. The possibility of broad judicial construction may
also discourage new companies from selecting the particular state as their state of incorporation. Id.
at 362.
A vague statute will also harm the minority shareholders' interests because of the court's recogni-
tion of the business judgment rule and the right of majority control. See supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text.
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shareholder conduct according to the reasonable expectations of the mi-
nority shareholder.9 8 The proposed statute clarifies the level of oppres-
sion that would warrant judicial relief by reflecting investment realities in
a close corporation.99
The proposed statute reads as follows:
Involuntary dissolution; alternative relief
(1) In the case of a close corporation having 35 shareholders or less, a
court may order dissolution or grant any alternative relief under this sec-
tion in an action brought by one or more directors or one or more share-
holders upon proof that those in control of the corporation have
(a) acted fraudulently or illegally;
(b) mismanaged the corporation; or
(c) violated the strict good faith fiduciary duty that shareholders in a
close corporation owe one another by frustrating the reasonable ex-
pectations of one or more shareholders.I°°
(2) A court shall take the following into account when determining the
reasonable expectations of a shareholder:
(a) the reasonable expectations of a shareholder existing at the time of
incorporation and those developing during the shareholder's partici-
pation in the corporation;010
(b) the reasonable expectations of a shareholder to serve as an em-
ployee, officer or director of the corporation.10 2
This proposed statute would enable courts to grant relief to minority
shareholders despite traditional principles such as majority rule, the busi-
98. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
99. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty, 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), affd,
173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980). The special circumstances, arrangements and personal
relationships that frequently underlie the formation of close corporations generate certain expecta-
tions among the shareholders concerning their respective roles in corporate affairs, including man-
agement and earnings. These expectations preclude the drawing of any conclusions about the impact
of a particular course of corporate conduct on a shareholder without taking into consideration the
role that he is expected to play.
167 N.J. Super. at 154-55, 400 A.2d at 561. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
100. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(3)(a) (West 1984). See generally Olson, supra note 77,
at 10.
101. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102. For a similar provision, see N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:12-7(l)(c) (West Supp. 1984-85). The
Commissioner's comment to this New Jersey statute states that "the additional words [whether in
his capacity as a shareholder, director, or employee of the corporation] reflect the fact in a closely-
held corporation oppressive conduct often takes the form of freezing-out a minority shareholder by
removing him from his various offices... in the absence the courts might feel constrained to look
exclusively to direct injury to the shareholders' stock interest." N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:12-7(l)(c),
comment (West Supp. 1984-85).
[Vol. 63:545
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ness judgment rule, and the employment-at-will rule. First, the proposed
statute would limit the exercise of majority control by imposing a strict
good faith fiduciary duty upon the shareholders.' 0 3 This concept was
illustrated in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home. l In Wilkes, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the removal of
Wilkes as a salaried officer and director breached the fiduciary duties of
utmost good faith and loyalty owed him by the other shareholders in the
close corporation. 105 The court allowed Wilkes to recover the salary he
would have received had he remained an officer and director.'0 6 The
court stated that minority shareholders expect to participate in corporate
management.10 7 Thus, the general corporate law's reliance on the princi-
ple of majority rule, which presumes that the minority shareholder con-
sents to corporate policies as determined by the majority, conflicts with
the realities of investor expectations in a close corporation.10 8 Therefore,
little justification exists to extend the principle of majority rule to a close
corporation.
Second, the proposed statute would limit the exercise of the business
judgment rule. As an example, the New Jersey Superior Court, in Ex-
adaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty,"° adopted the reasonable expectations
test and noted that the business judgment rule should not apply because
the rule enables majority shareholders to abuse their authority at the mi-
nority's expense." 0 The business judgment rule is based on premises
inconsistent with the special characteristics of close corporations."'
103. See Involuntary Dissolution, supra note 9, at 1140-41.
104. 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
105. Id. at 848, 352 N.E.2d at 661. The court defined the fiduciary duty as substantially the
same fiduciary duty that partners owe to one another, a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty. Id.
106. Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63.
107. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
108. See, eg., Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980) (minority
shareholder expected to manage corporation's cocktail lounge); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Re-
alty, 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1972) (minority shareholder expected to participate in
management of corporation's real estate business); Capitol Toyota v. Gerwin, 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss.
1980) (plaintiff expected to manage car dealership).
109. 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d
994 (App. Div. 1980).
110. Id. at 154, 400 A.2d at 561. In Exadaktilos, the court held that the minority shareholder's
expectation to participate in management was frustrated by his own failure to learn the business.
The majority, therefore, had a legitimate business purpose for discharging the minority shareholder
and did not act oppressively. Id. at 155-56, 400 A.2d at 526.
111. See supra notes 20, 21 & 26 and accompanying text; F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 583
n.7.
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Even though a majority shareholder has been selected a director, the mi-
nority shareholder still has a reasonable expectation to participate in
management. This expectation justifies courts substituting their judg-
ment for that of the controlling directors.1 12 Moreover, in a close corpo-
ration, the decisions facing directors are not as complex as those facing
directors in public corporations and are well within the scope of judicial
understanding. 113
Section (2)(a) emphasizes the expectations generated by the original
business bargain but also recognizes the need to examine the entire his-
tory of the employer-employee relationship." 4 This section, therefore,
provides courts flexibility to consider the changing expectations that de-
velop over the course of the shareholder's participation in the business. 115
Third, the proposed statute would limit the exercise of the employ-
ment-at-will rule by enabling courts to grant relief according to the mi-
nority shareholder's reasonable employment expectations. 116 Like most
employees today, minority shareholders in close corporations depend on
their corporate employers for economic survival.' 17  Because minority
shareholders expect continued employment, courts could provide relief
for wrongful discharge under the proposed statute. This statutory relief
addresses the concerns of those courts that refuse to permit a wrongful
discharge action absent legislative approval."'
The potential plaintiff pool for wrongful discharge actions under the
proposed statute would be limited. Because the statutory exception to
the employment-at-will rule would be narrow, most employees would re-
main subject to the rule. Therefore, the proposed statute would not en-
courage wrongful discharge litigation. In addition, the proposed statute
112. See supra notes 13, 14 & 78-92 and accompanying text.
113. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 584; Involuntary Dissolution, supra note 9, at 1150.
114. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
115. Professor Olson has discussed a similar provision, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West
1984): "While certain expectations are probably common to all noncontrolling shareholders, the
reasonable expectations of a particular shareholder will vary depending on the circumstances and the
nature of the corporation .... An examination of the assumptions and expectations of the parties
will allow the court to determine when and in what form that return [on his capital] should be
made." Olson, supra note 77, at 23.
116. Under the proposed statute, courts could apply a public policy exception to the employ-
ment-at-will rule. The second classification of the public policy exception, discharge of an employee
for exercising a statutory right, would cover a shareholder's reasonable employment expectation as
recognized by the proposed statute. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
118. See, eg., cases cited supra note 66.
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would limit excessive damage awards by protecting only reasonable em-
ployment expectations.1 19 Because of the inherent personal characteris-
tics of a close corporation, juries would not perceive the litigation as
pitting a terminated shareholder employee against a large, impersonal
corporation. 
120
Courts often justify their reluctance to grant dissolution by stating that
dissolution may have an adverse effect on the community, eliminating
jobs and depriving consumers of a viable business.12 The proposed stat-
ute, however, would not necessarily result in dissolution of the corpora-
tion. Section (1) would give courts authority to order dissolution or to
grant any alternative relief.122 Courts would consider all the facts and
circumstances of each case in determining the appropriate form of re-
lief.123  Thus, courts could require the controlling shareholders to buy
out an oppressed shareholder, thereby avoiding interruption in business
operations. Prospective investors would be encouraged to invest in close
corporations knowing that they would not become locked into the corpo-
ration without recourse against the majority shareholders.124
V. CONCLUSION
By imposing an obligation of utmost good faith, the proposed statute
would protect minority shareholders from the harsh results of majority
rule. Likewise, the incorporation of the reasonable expectations test
119. For examples of jury verdicts exceeding one million dollars, see Chancellor v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (S1.9 million actual and punitive damages plus $400,000
in attorney's fees for three executives), cert denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1983); McGrath v. Zenith Radio,
651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.) ($1.3 million actual and punitive damages after remittitur to single em-
ployee), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
120. Commentators who argue for revision or abolition of the employment-at-will rule fail to
address the problem that juries may sympathize with the employee, a common man, when manage-
ment dismisses him. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assess-
ment of the Labor Law Issue of the 8O's 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 3-4 (1984).
121. See, e.g., Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 125 (N.D. Ala. 1968);
see also Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3, at 27.
122. For possible alternative remedial measures, see Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc.,
264 Or. 614, 632-33, 507 P.2d 387, 395-96 (1973); Masinter v. Webco, Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 441 n.12
(W. Va. 1980); Proposed Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, § 16, Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, American Bar Association, reprinted in 36 Bus. LAW. 269 (1981). See generally F.
O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 9.05, at 587-97.
123. See Olson, supra note 77, at 19. "The court's remedial discretion is without statutory
limit.... The relief granted should be proportioned to the degree of mistreatment that has been
suffered by the non-controlling shareholder." Id
124. See Involuntary Dissolution, supra note 9, at 1151.
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would temper the application of the business judgment rule. Finally, the
proposed statute would recognize the minority shareholder's reasonable
employment expectation and would create a narrow public policy excep-
tion to the employment-at-will rule. The proposed involuntary dissolu-
tion and alternative relief statute would afford minority shareholders
greater relief and would effectively balance the minority shareholder's
interests with those of the majority.
Russell D. Phillips, Jr.
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